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This Article develops an analytical framework by which to assess the
appropriate federal role in medical malpractice. It identifies a set of non-
exhaustive criteria for federal involvement, including: (1) Is there a need for
uniformity across states? (2) Are there overriding national interests? (3) Is there
consensus on identification of the problem and on the range of potential
solutions? (4) Are states actively considering or dealing with the issue? (5) Is
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there a special federal comparative advantage in addressing the issue? On the
basis of these various criteria, I establish a continuum of potential federal
involvement and suggest some particular areas appropriate for a constructive
federal role.
I. Is THERE A NEED FOR UNIFORMITY?.
Products liability presents a strong-though not limitless-case for uniform
treatment. Manufacturers typically make products for use in regional or
national markets. The costs exacted by state-imposed standards may be
considerable and may be exported if economies of scale in production require
that the most stringent state standard be adhered to in all state markets. There
are, however, constitutional limitations on a state's ability "to impose burdens
on the interstate market."' Under "principles of state sovereignty and
comity,"2 states must "respect the interests of other States," 3 which have
"autonomy . . . within their respective spheres."' Thus, the case for
federalization of products liability standards responds to traditional commerce
clause and federalism rationales for federal intervention.5
Medical treatment decisions, on the other hand, typically occur within and
have their major effect within a state.6 There are few interstate spillover
1. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1597 (1996).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324,335-36 (1989)). In BMWthe Supreme Court
acknowledged the limitations on extraterritoriality embodied in the dormant commerce clause. Id. (citing
Healy, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-96
(1824)). BMWheld that "a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the
intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States" because that "would be infringing
on the policy choices of other States." Id. Under the dormant commerce clause, state regulation with
a legitimate local purpose and merely an incidental effect on interstate commerce will be struck down
if interstate commerce is burdened excessively in relation to the putative local benefits. Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
5. This does not necessarily mean that a federal approach is warranted; the point is that there is a
strong case to be made, even in light of traditional considerations of federalism and state control of
products standards, for a more aggressive federal stance in the products liability arena.
6. For many years, the law of medical malpractice focused on the standard of practice in the same
or similar community. More recently, courts have moved to a national standard. See, e.g., Shilkret v.
Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A.2d 245,248-53 (Md. 1975). To the extent that such national
uniformity is desired by states, it can be achieved by state common law or statutory law. At the same
time, researchers have acknowledged the existence of clinical uncertainty reflected in widely divergent
rates for a variety of procedures. See, e.g., Tavs F. Andersen & Gavin Mooney, Medical Practice
Variations: Where Are We?, in THE CHALLENGES OF MEDICAL PRACTICE VARIATIONS 1 (Tavs F.
Andersen & Gavin Mooney eds., 1990); John E. Wenberg, Dealing with MedicalPractice Variations:
A Proposal for Action, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6. Some commentators have questioned the
wisdom and ongoing appropriateness of the unitary standard of care, which has characterized medical
malpractice doctrine and which has been the engine for the nationalization of the standard of care. See,
e.g., James F. Blumstein, Cost Containment and MedicalMalpractice, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND
TORT: SYSTEMS ON A COLLISION COURSE? 76, 91-94 (Elizabeth Rolph ed., 1993); John A. Siliciano,
Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Maipractice Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439 (1991); Jonathan
J. Frankel, Note, MedicalMalpractice Law and Health Care Cost Containment: Lessons for Reformers
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effects on service-providers and consumers. In addition, there is a tradition of
local regulation in the area of medical malpractice. 7 Professional licensure is
a traditional state function8 and quality assurance is a customary element of the
licensure process. 9
II. ARE THERE OVERRIDING NATIONAL INTERESTS?
Overriding national interests may be commercial or economic; they may
also be of a police power or a moral dimension, such as civil rights.1"
Clearly, some federal interests exist in the area of medical malpractice. In its
role as payor," the federal government has an interest in medical malpractice
issues. There has been a longstanding federal interest in the quality of care of
medical delivery for federal beneficiaries. 2 The Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) evinced this strong federal interest in
quality of care more generally by providing qualified immunity for certain
types of peer review activities. 3 It also established a medical malpractice
reporting system designed to increase the amount of information available to
hospitals concerning the practice experience of physicians applying for staff
privileges." The mobility of physicians necessitated a federal data bank so
that all sources of information could be made available to hospital decision-
makers. Decisions on qualifications, however, remain with hospitals and their
from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297 (1994).
7. The same arguably can be asserted regarding products standards, but there have been federal
inroads, on state autonomy in fields such as auto and consumer products safety.
8. See generally California State Bd. of Optometry v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 910 F.2d 976
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (barring FTC eyeglass regulation and expressing federalism concerns). One striking
feature of the Clinton Administration's healthcare reform proposal was Section 1161, which would
have provided that "[nlo state may, through licensure or otherwise, restrict the practice of any class of
health professionals beyond what is justified by the skills and training of such professionals." H.R.
3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1161 (1993). This would have constituted a federal challenge to state
lieensure provisions. For a discussion of the Clinton Administration proposal, see James F. Blumstein,
Health Care Reform: The Policy Context, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 15, 20 n.23 (1994); James F.
Blumstein, The CUnton Administration Health Care Reform Plan: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 19 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 201, 204-05 (1994).
9. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 40-42
(1991).
10. See James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing
Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1257-59 (1994). Unemployment insurance would be an example
of a mixture of the commercial and the social welfare policy objectives.
11. The federal government is a payor for its employees, for its military personnel and their
dependents, and for its public beneficiaries in programs such as Medicaid and Medicare. The
government is also a provider of services through the Indian Health Service and the Veterans
Administration.
12. The Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO) legislation enacted in 1972, see
generally Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with QualitylCost Trade-Offs in Medical
Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 6 (1975), and its successor, the Peer Review
Organization (PRO) program, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1994), suggest a strong federal concern with the
quality of care paid for by the federal government on behalf of designated federal beneficiaries.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111-11152 (1994).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11136 (1994).
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medical staffs. Regulatory decisions concerning licensure remain with state
authorities. Is
While there is surely some federal stake in medical malpractice, it is not
overriding. Where the federal government has intervened, it has pursued a
philosophy of shared interests between federal and state governments. Federal
initiatives have not been designed to supersede state legislation. Though one
can therefore make the case that the federal government is not uninterested in
medical malpractice, there is no overriding federal interest in asserting a
comprehensive, exclusive federal authority that precludes state policymaking.
Ill. Is THERE CONSENSUS ON PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION OR SOLUTION?
There is a value in allowing states to experiment with alternative
approaches. Different approaches in different jurisdictions can be studied and
evaluated, with states being able to copy, adopt, modify or reject approaches
they deem unsuitable. An absence of consensus therefore implies the
desirability of further policy development by the states. Prematurely iniform,
federal policy can harden the intellectual arteries, potentially stifling innovation
and experimentation.
To date, there is no agreed identification of the medical malpractice
problem. Malpractice as a policy problem has three possible dimensions-insur-
ance, quality of care, and compensation for victimized patients. Each version
of the malpractice problem presents very different solutions. During the
perceived medical malpractice crisis of the mid-1980s, the federal government
enacted legislation concerning two of these three problems-insurance and
quality. In doing so, the federal government focused on issues within its
peculiar ken, and was respectful of federalism values and subsidiarity
principles. Federal involvement to this point has been incremental, finely-
tuned, and carefully targeted to policies where a national interest has been
deemed overriding.
15. The federal government has conferred immunity in a variety of contexts. For example, persons
on PSRO-PRO reviewing panels have immunity from liability. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(b) (1994). See
Kwoun v. Southeast Mo. Professional Standards Org., 811 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1986). Similarly, the
PSRO and PRO legislation confers immunity for malpractice on all practitioners who comply with
PSRO-PRO standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c) (1994). The rationale for this immunity was to eliminate
malpractice risk for practitioners engaged in cost containment efforts. PSRO-PRO immunity was
designed to counter the perceived threat of defensive medicine. Its impact has been uncertain. The
statutory provision has never been cited as determinative on the standard-of-care issue in any reported
medical malpractice appellate case.
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111-11152 (1994), conferred
immunity from antitrust liability and other federal and state liability for peer review actions. There are
certain limitations to the immunity provisions. With respect to public hospitals, suits under federal civil
rights statutes (particularly 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)) are not precluded. Immunity is limited to good
faith peer review activities, which appears to be more a codification of pre-existing case law than a
break with precedent.
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A. Insurance
If insurance is the policy focus, a number of questions arise. 6 Should
public policy emphasize costs, and if so to whom? To doctors? To hospitals?
What is the effect of escalating insurance costs? What causes the escalation in
insurance costs? Are the increases passed on to patients? Is lack of insurance
availability a concern? Why has it been a problem in the past in certain areas?
What impact does the unavailability of medical malpractice insurance have on
a physician's practice, and on overall patient access to medical care? How
significant is the availability problem in the aggregate? If it is not now a
concern, how has the problem been resolved and is it likely to recur?
One particular focus is likely to be insurance company profitability, and the
question of whether the costs of insurance regulation create unduly high
barriers to entering the insurance market, thus immunizing existing carriers
from competition.17 The 1986 amendments to the Risk Retention Act, which
may be viewed as a partial federal response to this concern,' 8 restricted states'
capacity to regulate self-insurers,' 9 thus facilitating their entry into the
insurance market. The amendments reversed the traditional regulatory power
of state insurance commissions over potential entrants. Compliance with
regulatory requirements in one state was given greater deference, and the
definition of liability insurance covered by the statute was broadened.2"
Clearly, more competition in the industry was contemplated.21
The 1986 amendments, enacted during a perceived "crisis" in medical
malpractice, would seem to be a response to the medical malpractice
problem-at least when the latter is viewed from an insurance perspective.
Entry barriers to the insurance market were reduced by concentrating state
regulation of liability insurance carriers into single states. 2 This was a form
of regulation that necessarily required federal intervention, yet was measured
and respectful of state interests in the field.
B. Quality of Care
Under general tort theory, the risk of adverse malpractice judgments-and
their associated financial and reputational costs-deters poor quality medical
care. From a quality of care perspective, then, the key question is whether this
16. For a comprehensive discussion of the medical malpractice insurance industry, see FRANK A.
SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1991).
17. Id. at 59-72.
18. Pub. L. 99-563, 100 Stat. 3170 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906 (Supp. 1996)).
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3901(a)(4), 3902(a) (Supp. 1996).
20. Id. §§ 3901(a)(2), 3903(b)(2).
21. Pub. L. 99-563, § 11(b).
22. For a description of the federal risk retention legislation and how it works, see Maureen A.
Sanders, Risk Retention Groups: Who's Sorry Now?, 19 S. ILL. U. W. 531 (1993).
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deterrent system works in practice, and the available evidence is not altogether
encouraging. We find, in fact, that many more medical injuries are attributable
to malpractice than the number of claims filed would suggest.?3 If patients
who can file successful malpractice claims are not doing so, the system is not
eliminating the problem of poor medical practice. The issue becomes whether
the malpractice system is achieving optimal deterrence of poor medical care.
Although physicians express concern that "defensive" medicine requires
what they deem to be unnecessary procedures or tests, approaches character-
ized as "defensive" can sometimes be seen as improving quality-of-care.
Malpractice law does not require tests or procedures that are of no benefit. The
contentious issue involves the degree of benefit to be derived from a particular
test or procedure. The provision of services of no benefit is the easy case,
although there is not always a consensus about what interventions bring about
zero benefit and risk-averse providers may tend to err on the side of over-
provision in the absence of countervailing factors. The appropriate analytical
issue is whether optimal deterrence exists regarding the low-benefit but high-
cost interventions.
Proponents of medical malpractice as a deterrent of poor quality care would
justify some forms of "defensive medicine" as appropriate higher-quality
medicine. Decreasing the range of diagnostic uncertainty is expensive. Doing
more tests and securing additional increments of data give rise to better, albeit
more expensive, science. Medical malpractice law reconfigures the cost/benefit
calculation done by providers by putting them at risk for not pursuing tests or
procedures that they would deem to be of low benefit and high cost.'
What are the consequences of a focus on quality-of-care issues as one's
definition of the medical malpractice problem? The Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 198626 (HCQIA) was arguably a partial response to this
perception of the medical malpractice issue.' HCQIA promoted peer review
23. See HARvARD MEDICALMALPRACICESTUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990); PAuL C.
WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12-15 (1991).
24. There is a fundamental question of terminology regarding "defensive medicine." Properly
understood, the term cannot apply to any difference in treatment or diagnosis from concerns about legal
liability. Some shift in behavior in response to a cue from the tort system is, indeed, the very rationale
of the deterrence objective of tort law. What "defensive medicine" must mean is over-deterrence-not
just a response to a cue from malpractice law but an inappropriate response to that cue. This
fundamental definitional nuance is what (among other methodological factors) makes identifying and
measuring the "defensive medicine" phenomenon difficult indeed. For a general discussion of this set
of issues, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIvE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (1994).
25. Of course, the quality-enhancement function of medical malpractice can backfire to the extent
that administration of additional tests or treatment-an ill-adaptive form of "defensive medicine"-is
harmful to health. Malpractice law, however, does not mandate such harmful tests or treatment.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1994).
27. The legislative findings were quite clearly focused on concerns about quality-oriented aspects
of medical malpractice. Id. at § 11101(1) (1994).
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activity in order to increase intra-professional oversight and to effect better,
more rigorous and systematic monitoring of quality of care. As evidenced by
its statutory findings, the clear aim of the Act was to reduce medical
malpractice by promoting better quality medical care. Section 402(1), for
example, notes that "[t]he increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the
need to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems
that warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual
state. "
28
The legislation was driven, in part, by a sense of a special and appropriate
federal interest in providing malpractice data across states.29 The Act
established a national data bank and required the reporting, collection and
distribution of data to licensing boards, hospitals, health maintenance organiza-
tions and other health care providers that employ, contract with, or give
clinical privileges to physicians.30 Three types of information must be
reported under the Act. First, any entity such as an insurance company that
makes a payment in settlement of a malpractice claim must report information
regarding the claim and associated circumstances, including the amount of
payment, the type of malpractice alleged, and the injuries that resulted.
31
Second, any Board of Medical Examiners that sanctions a physician must
report its action, the reasons for the action, and information respecting the
circumstances. 32 Third, health care entities such as hospitals or IMOs must
report on adverse peer review actions concerning a physician's competence or
professional conduct. 33 Reporting on peer review of non-physician providers
is permitted but not required.' In all three situations, the required information
must be reported to the appropriate state licensing board and to the clearing-
house set up under contract with the federal government. Ultimate decisionma-
king authority, however, remains unchanged.
C. Compensation
Finally, with regard to victim compensation, the medical malpractice
system is generally regarded as inefficient. 3' As a result of transactions and
28. Id.
29. There was also a fear in Congress, stemming from a then-pending antitrust decision, that federal
antitrust legislation might inhibit peer review activity. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988)
(holding physicians liable under federal antitrust laws for bad-faith anticompetitive conduct under guise
of hospital peer review).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11136 (1994).
31. Id. § 11131.
32. Id. § 11132.
33. Id. § 11133(a).
34. Id. § 11133(b).
35. See generally PATRICIA A. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRAC1I7CE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBuC POLICY 186-207 (1985). The justification for retention of the medical malpractice system is its
role in quality assurance-the traditional deterrence effect of a tort regime.
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other administrative costs associated with the filing and paying of claims,
including the costs of full-scale litigation, a relatively low percentage of total
dollars in the system is devoted directly to victim compensation.3" This piece
of the medical malpractice puzzle is perhaps the hardest to tackle from a
federal perspective through instruments that are peculiarly proper for federal
intervention. Even at the state level, these matters are still very much up in the
air. Overall, there is little consensus on the solution to this aspect of the
current malpractice problem.
IV. THE RECORD AND PROMISE OF STATE-BASED REFORM
State legislatures have a history of actively considering medical malpractice
matters. A number of states have enacted so-called tort reform legislation in
this area. Overall, medical malpractice has undoubtedly been a high priority
issue on state political agendas."7 There are reasons, however, to be skeptical
of state political processes.
A. State Statutory Barriers
While some commentators propose private, contractual solutions to the
medical malpractice problem,"8 the law in most states is hostile to the enforce-
ment of contracts in this area. 9 These laws and doctrines are apparently
premised on concerns about the insufficiency of consumer information and the
disparity in bargaining power between provider and consumer.' Despite these
concerns, however, there is no inherent reason why state political processes
cannot accommodate appropriate contractual arrangements. All that is required
is some legislative intervention at the state level.
With better information and improved bargaining parity, state law can be
made more receptive to private contracting arrangements. 41 Principles of
disclosure will become extremely important.42 Bargaining imparities can be
36. Id.
37. For a discussion of these medical malpractice reforms, see Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation
on MedicalMalpractice: FurtherDevelopments and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
499, 511-55 (1989). For an evaluation of an earlier round of malpractice reforms, see Frank A. Sloan,
State Responses to the Medical Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s:An EmpiricalAssessment,
9 J. HEALTH POL., POLVY & L. 629 (1985).
38. See, e.g., CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PrVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 265-302 (1994); Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of
Malpractice Risks between Patients and Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173,
182-99.
39. See HAVIGHURSr, supra note 38, at 310.
40. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-47 (Cal. 1963).
41. For a discussion of this set of issues, see HAVIGHURST, supra note 38, at 310-18.
42. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1180-82, 1184 n.II (Cal.
1976) (upholding arbitration clause in HMO contract negotiated by employer with adequate bargaining
power and who adequately represented the interests of its employees despite possible lack of actual
knowledge of arbitration clause by plaintiff employee).
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reduced by negotiating before the onset of disease. 3 Those negotiating on
behalf of patients-probably a union or other employee group representa-
tive-should probably be patient fiduciaries.' State courts are likely be more
skeptical of contractual arrangements entered into by employers and health care
providers on behalf of their employees.45
B. State Constitutional Barriers
In some jurisdictions, state constitutional barriers may prove more
formidable obstacles to contract-based reform.46 Various state courts have
interpreted state constitutional provisions more stringently than federal courts
have construed parallel federal constitutional provisions. Where federal courts
would apply a very deferential standard of review in equal protection analysis
of special malpractice rules or damages caps,47 a number of state courts have
been much more searching in their scrutiny of state legislative reforms of this
type.48 Using an intermediate standard of scrutiny, some state courts have
held that statutorily-based limitations on liability violate state equal protection
provisions.49
In addition, there are constitutional theories unique to state constitutional
interpretation; no parallel provisions exist in the federal constitution. In some
jurisdictions, state constitutional provisions guaranteeing access to the courts
require a quid pro quo for the abrogation or curtailment of common law
remedies, and have thus been held to invalidate damages caps. 0 Courts
43. See, e.g., Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981) (declining enforcement of
waiver of right to sue for negligence presented to patient at time procedure performed).
44. C. Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Servs., 3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding
insurance carrier, in making benefits determination under medical insurance policy, to fiduciary
standard).
45. See Blumstein, supra note 6, at 94-95.
One can hypothesize that judicial deference to and respect for contracting models will depend
in part on the perception by courts of whether these cost-containment programs are redistributive
takeaways, or whether they are aimed at rationalizing decisionmaking by encouraging
decisionmakers to balance quality with cost. Similarly, one can predict that the confluence of
interest between the beneficiary and the negotiator (e.g., an employee and an employee group)
will be an important factor in legitimizing the contractual arrangement.
Id.
46. See generally James F. Blumnstein & David R. Smith, Constitutional Attacks on Medical
MalpracticeLaws, in LEGAL LIABMrY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE IN NEWBORN SCREENING 167 (Lori
Andrews ed. 1985).
47. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Davis v.
Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (3d Cir. 1989); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196-97 (4th Cir.
1989).
48. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156, 165-70 (AIa. 1991); Brannigan
v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991). However, "the durability of tort reforms exceeds their general
reputation." Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 970 (1989).
49. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830-32, 836-39 (N.H. 1980).
50. Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 260 (Kan. 1988) ("[W]hen a
common-law remedy is modified or abolished, an adequate substitute remedy must be provided to
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applying the quid-pro-quo doctrine "substantively evaluate the fairness of the
[reform provision], requiring that a cut-back in a common-law right be
accompanied by a provision of a 'reasonable alternative remedy or commensu-
rate benefit.'" 51 The lack of an adequate quid pro quo can only be justified,
under this doctrine, by a state's establishing an "overpowering public necessity
for the abolishment of the right and no alternative method of meeting such
public necessity."52
State constitutional decisions that apply heightened scrutiny to invalidate
various reforms such as damages caps do restrict the flexibility of state
legislatures to enact medical malpractice reforms.5 3 Nevertheless, these state
court decisions reflect a minority viewpoint. Most state jurisdictions have either
upheld state medical malpractice reforms54 or failed to address the issue
directly. This raises a rather fundamental question about the deference owed
to state constitutional provisions. A strongly federalist position would defer to
state political and constitutional processes. A non-deferential strategy might
suggest federally-set standards.55 An intermediate position would federally
authorize state legislative reform, thereby in effect overruling state constitu-
tional obstacles and allowing state legislative judgments to control.
Unless strong national interests are otherwise involved, the inability of state
legislatures to respond because of state constitutional constraints should not be
considered a deficiency in the state political system, nor thought to show that
the issue of medical malpractice is not being actively debated within state
politics. To the contrary, the state court decisions noted supra arise precisely
because the issue is part of an active political debate, else there would be no
reason for state judicial intervention. Alternative reforms may yet be found
replace it.").
51. Bovbjerg etal., supra note 48, at 971 n.264 (quoting Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So.2d
1080, 1088 (Fla. 1987)); see also Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (rex. 1988).
52. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088.
53. Note that damages caps have also been held to violate state constitutional rights to jury trial.
The leading case is Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989); see also Moore v. Mobile
Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991). The leading state case rejecting the jury trial theory is
Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989). For a discussion of this issue, see
Bovbjerg et al., supra note 48, at 972-74.
Seventh Amendment jury trial challenges to damages caps under the federal constitution have been
rejected. Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1989); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir.
1989). Moreover, the Supreme Court has questioned whether the Seventh Amendment applies to the
remedies phase of civil litigation. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 n.9 (1987) ("Nothing
in the [Seventh] Amendment's language suggests that the right to a jury trial extends to the remedy
phase of a civil trial .... We have been presented with no evidence that the Framers meant to extend
the right to a jury to the remedy phase of a civil trial.").
54. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed,
474 U.S. 892 (1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1990); Peters v. Saft, 597
A.2d 50 (Me. 1991); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992); Adams v. Children's Mercy
Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992); Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
55. The House of Representatives has twice approved damages caps for medical malpractice awards
in the 1995-96 session.
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viable within the constraints imposed by state constitutions.
C. Federal Constraints
Further restraints on state-based reforms are imposed by existing federal
legislation. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,56
the federal government can preempt state legislation if acting pursuant to
federal legislative power." Malpractice preemption concerns arise in a
number of areas, especially antitrust, labor, and employee benefits and
pensions law. Where existing federal rules constrain state legislative flexibility,
federally-based reform rests on a firmer foundation.
1. Antitrust Law
Prior to the enactment of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
(HCQIA),58 there was concern about the ability of states to provide for
hospital peer review. Since, by definition, peer review consists of evaluation
by a physician's potential competitors, there was a risk that federal antitrust
laws would prohibit the enforcement of peer review as anticompetitive.59
HCQIA immunizes good faith peer review against the reach of federal antitrust
law, thereby allowing states to pursue quality assurance through this ap-
proach. 60
2. Labor Law
By tradition, federal labor law preemptively and entirely precludes state
legislative action in the field of labor-management collective-bargaining
relations. 61 Consequently, any state legislative initiative to give legal effect to
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
57. See JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 319 (5th ed. 1995).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 11111-11152 (1994).
59. See generally James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer Review, 51
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 7 (Spring 1988).
60. See id. at 32-34, 82-86. Prior to the enactment of HCQIA, states could provide for peer review
as a form of quality assurance under the state-action antitrust immunity doctrine. See Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). To qualify for state-action protection, the arguably anticompetitive restraint must
be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy." California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)). In addition, "the State must supervise actively any
private anticompetitive conduct." Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 57 (1985). The "active supervision" component has been construed to require the actual
exercise of decisionmaking authority by government-"serious, ongoing state involvement in the nitty
gritty of decisionmaking... ." James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of
Medical Care:Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1459, 1502
(1994). The kind of general hospital regulation that typifies most state laws is insufficient to satisfy state-
action requirements. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
61. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959).
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or put constraints upon labor-management collective agreements6' with respect
to medical malpractice standards or remedies must be consistent with federal
labor law. To the extent that state legislative initiatives are barred by federal
labor policy,' federal legislation could be justified as allowing state experi-
mentation to proceed.
3. Employee Benefits and Pensions Law
A similar set of issues arises with respect to federal preemption under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 4 ERISA's
preemption provision is quite broad, barring any state law that "relate[s] to"
qualified employee benefit plans,' and has been construed by the Supreme
Court to preempt state legislation that has "a connection with or reference to
such a plan,"' even where state law is of general application and not directed
explicitly at ERISA plans.67 ERISA therefore places considerable limits upon
state legislation.68
The interrelationship between the ERISA preemption provision and state
medical malpractice claims has recently received considerable attention from
the federal courts. In Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.,69 the Fifth Circuit
staked out a strong ERISA preemption position. An employee under an ERISA
health plan sued the employer's utilization review company for negligent
denial of hospital inpatient certification that allegedly resulted in a miscarriage.
The court upheld the dismissal of the suit on grounds of ERISA preemption.
Even though a utilization review decision has a medical decisionmaking
component, the court concluded that those decisions were "part and parcel" of
62. See, e.g., Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (holding state tort claim for
bad-faith handling of an insurance claim preempted under federal labor law and therefore subject to
collective bargaining agreement).
63. Cf. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994) (holding state statute preempted by federal
labor law).
64. ERISA's preemption provision is at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
65. ERISA contains a saving clause that exempts from preemption state laws that regulate the
business of insurance. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). This manifests respect for the states'
traditional role in the regulation of insurance. However, state laws that purport to regulate the business
of insurance cannot deem an employee benefit plan to be in the business of insurance. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
66. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
67. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) ("[A) state law may 'relate
to' a benefit plan, and thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such
plans, or the effect is only indirect.").
68. Some greater flexibility in the health regulation arena is suggested by the Supreme Court's
recent decision New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) (upholding hospital surcharges under ERISA challenge). See generally Karen
A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Supportfor the Argument to Restrain ERISA Pre-emption, 13 YALE
J. ON REG. 255 (1996).
69. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
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determining "what benefits are available" under the employer's ERISA
plan.7" Accordingly, plaintiffs were "attempting to recover for a tort allegedly
committed in the course of handling a benefit determination."71 ERISA
preempted such a claim,' even if based on a theory of medical malprac-
tice.73
Corcoran admittedly left plaintiffs without a remedy for what may have
been an error in medical judgment, and that troubled the Fifth Circuit.74 From
a federalism perspective, such restrictions on traditional state malpractice
actions are problematic, especially where preemption of state tort policies and
associated remedies leaves a potential victim remediless. Indeed, though
Corcoran has been followed elsewhere,7' certain other circuits have taken a
different tack. In Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage,76 the Tenth Circuit
found that ERISA did not preempt a medical malpractice claim based on
vicarious liability against an ERISA IMO for the conduct of one of its doctors.
Similarly, in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,' the Third Circuit rejected
an ERISA preemption attack on a medical malpractice action against an HMO.
The decisionmaking body challenged in Corcoran "only performed an
administrative function inherent in the 'utilization review.' "78 Preemption
therefore followed. In Dukes, however, the defendant lIMOs arranged for and
supervised the physicians who actually provided medical treatment to plan
participants. In arranging for treatment-in contrast to engaging in utilization
review-the HMOs were not in a position to deny ERISA benefits. For the
Dukes court, only the utilization-review role was protected by ERISA
preemption; when arranging for members' medical treatment, ERISA HMOS
would not be immune from conventional state actions for medical malprac-
tice.
79
A strong case for federal legislation can be made when state legislative
reform is constrained by existing federal restrictions. Although subsequent
decisions have offset many of the misgivings engendered by Corcoran, it is
nevertheless appropriate to ask whether, as the court in that case intimated,
federal liberalization to accommodate state tort policies is worth further
consideration. Clearly, it is costly to reinvent the wheel on a state-by-state
basis. The pro-federalism position, however, would assert that the advantages
70. The court seemed to acknowledge that a purely medical-treatment decision would not result in
preemption. Id. at 1333 n.16.
71. Id. at 1332.
72. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987).
73. For a thoughtful discussion of the Corcoran case, see Frankel, supra note 6, at 1310-14.
74. 965 F.2d at 1338-39.
75. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993).
76. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
77. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
78. Id. at 360.
79. Id. at 360-61. Accord Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995).
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of experimentation outweigh such costs. An efficiency argument can be made
where a clear and uniform approach with a national consensus exists. This is
surely not the situation in the medical malpractice arena in any broad,
comprehensive sense. Except, possibly, with regard to existing federal
constraints on state legislative authority, the case for significant or com-
prehensive federal regulation has not been made.
V. COMPARATIVE FEDERAL ADVANTAGES
There are a number of areas in which the federal government might have
a special comparative advantage. First, it has a special interest in developing
pilot programs.80 These demonstration projects would be of national benefit.
In economic terms, any state that carries on an experiment is providing an
external benefit to other states. The benefit accrues to others, yet the single
state puts up the money for the demonstration. There is therefore a strong
economic argument for the federal government to sponsor demonstrations that
nationally internalize benefits external to any individual state.
The federal government also has a particular interest in the malpractice
problem as it relates to its own employees and public beneficiaries. Public
dollars are expended with the provision of services to federal civilian and
military employees (covered under the federal employee health benefits
programs CHAMPUS and FEHBP) and to public beneficiaries (Medicare and
Medicaid recipients). Here, the federal government has a clear concern with
quality of care and cost issues, and, to the extent that medical malpractice
occurs, with victim compensation also. If systemic inefficiencies raise the costs
of achieving compensation goals, the government as payor has a particular
interest, and to the extent that the system of medical malpractice is not
performing its deterrence function adequately, the federal government as payor
has a particular quality-of-care concern with respect to these groups.
A third area in which the federal government has a special comparative
advantage focuses upon research and data distribution. Research benefits accrue
broadly to the entire nation, which suggests that federal financing is appropriate
for such public goods. Federal requirements for recordkeeping, data acquisition
and dissemination help to perfect the market in ways that are unavailable to
individual states. Since state jurisdictions are more limited than regional or
national medical markets, requirements for recordkeeping and data acquisition
can be more effectively and efficiently enforced at the federal level. This seems
to be the rationale behind the federal data bank established under HCQIA.
80. The Clinton Administration's healthcare reform proposal included an enterprise liability
experiment. For a description of the enterprise liability concept and its rationale, see Kenneth S.
Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise MedicalLiability and the Evolution ofthe American Health Care
System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1994).
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VI. A CONTINUUM OF POrENTIAL FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT
Based upon the foregoing considerations regarding federal intervention, one
can develop a continuum of potential federal involvement. At one end of the
spectrum, the federal government could simply ignore federalism. The Supreme
Court has construed the Commerce Clause so broadly that large-scale federal
intervention in the medical malpractice area is almost certainly constitutionally
valid. The federal government could therefore act comprehensively, as if it
were a state legislature. Based upon the preceding analysis, however, this
would be unwise and certainly premature. There is no evidence that Congress
has any such plans under consideration at present."'
The federal government could embark on a more modest preemption
strategy. If the federal government were to embrace a pilot program strategy,
for example, it could develop a legal framework applicable to that pilot
program and preempt state legislation that would otherwise be applicable to the
participants in the pilot program. This strategy would give some integrity to the
experimental character of a federally-sponsored program, but would not intrude
upon state prerogatives in other areas-or at least not until the results of the
experiments were analyzed and digested.
Another type of federal involvement would be a federal requirement that
mandates state consideration, but not enactment, of a set of federally-specified
alternatives. This approach was used in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA), and subsequently upheld against constitutional challenge by
the Supreme Court.' It would set a timetable and agenda for state legislative
consideration of potential approaches set forth in federal legislation, but not
mandate enactment of any particular alternative. This type of approach might
seem justified were states failing to grapple with medical malpractice issues.
But this does not seem to be the case. State legislatures have a history of
dealing with medical malpractice questions as the perceived need arises. The
issue percolates to the top of state legislative agendas on its own. The PURPA-
type approach appears needlessly intrusive for the area of medical malpractice.
A further alternative would be to authorize state action in reliance on
federal legislation." This would overcome state constitutional limits to state
81. Congress has acted comprehensively with regard to national standards for products liability.
That legislation was vetoed by President Clinton. The federalism case for or against national products
liability standards must rise or fall on its own merits, but clearly the interstate dimension of products
standards makes them prima facie more suitable for federal involvement. See supra Part I.
82. 16U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645(1994); 15U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211(1994); 16U.S.C. § 324A-3 (1994).
83. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). The present status
of this decision, however, is somewhat uncertain. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408
(1992) (barring federal commandeering of state government to accomplish federal policy objectives).
84. Federal legislation could authorize private contractual reforms, thus clarifying the legal
authority for such conduct. See supra Section IV. To the extent that federal labor law or ERISA impedes
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legislation. The proposed federal damages cap on medical malpractice awards
for noneconomic loss' can arguably be explained-albeit not justified-on this
basis.86 An alternative to a federal damages cap might be the extension of the
federal data-gathering mission from reporting money paid out from malpractice
claims (under HCQIA) to specific identification of and inclusion of jury awards
in medical malpractice actions. These national data could then enable states to
implement proposals for modified scheduling of damages for pain and
suffering, the most variable components of damage awards." This federal
data collection role, already in place in the broad context of malpractice awards
and settlements, would be expanded under proposed legislation;88 the
particularized data requirements for achieving some form of modified
scheduling could easily be added to the existing system or the proposed
expanded system. Moreover, this approach would comport with an appropriate
federal role in gathering and providing data while not coercing or substituting
for state policy.89
A final approach would be for the federal government to place conditions
on specific or general federal spending programs. This has been the approach
used in the area of organ transplantation. 90 Any center that gathers or
transplants organs must participate in a national network if it wishes to retain
its participation in and reimbursement from Medicare. In theory, this approach
is less intrusive on state autonomy, because it places conditions on federal
spending programs from which the states are free to abstain. The degree of
federal intrusion is directly related to the centrality of the federal programs to
which the conditions are linked. Participation in Medicare or Medicaid, for
example, is so fundamental that linkage to either of those programs is virtually
identical in practice to a comprehensive federal regulatory system. Linkage to
that development, a strong federalism argument can be made in support of such an initiative. Explicit
legislative authorization may be unnecessary, however, since at least one court of appeals has suggested
that ERISA may authorize private contracting with regard to medical malpractice issues:
It may well be that an employer and an HMO could agree that a quality of health care standard
articulated in their contract would replace the standards that would otherwise be supplied by the
applicable state law of tort. We express no view on whether an ERISA plan sponsor may thus
by contract opt out of state tort law and into a federal law of ERISA contract.
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 359 (3d Cir. 1995).
85. Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996, H.R. 3103, 104th Cong., 2d sess.,
§ 282(a)(1) (1996) (limiting noneconomic loss to $250,000).
86. See supra Section IV.
87. See James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991). In jurisdictions that have invalidated
damages caps, implementation of a modified scheduling approach would likely pass constitutional
muster. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 48, at 969-74.
88. H.R. 3103, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., § 221 (establishing data collection system for civil
judgments against health care providers, suppliers or practitioners "related to the delivery of a health
care item or service").
89. This would leave to the states the actual substantive implementation of such an approach.
90. See generally James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ Transplantation Policy: A Thme for
Reassessment?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 451 (1989).
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more modest federal programs is obviously less potent but also, for that reason,
shows greater respect for state autonomy.91
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is a continuum of potential federal intervention
regarding medical malpractice issues. There has been federal intervention on
insurance questions and on quality of care through peer review, as well as
recent activity regarding damages caps for noneconomic loss in medical
malpractice cases. For sound reasons, there has been relatively little federal
initiative on medical malpractice standards. I have suggested, as an alternative,
a federal data-gathering role consistent with the existing medical practice data
bank. Such an approach would facilitate state adoption of a form of modified
scheduling and other approaches toward normalizing awards for pain and
suffering, the most divergent and unpredictable element of damages in medical
malpractice awards. It would also be consistent with federal comparative
advantages and would not intrude on state policymaking.
In addition, the federal government might consider a pilot program for its
own special * constituencies-federal employees who participate in the
CHAMPUS and FE-BP programs, and public beneficiaries who participate in
the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The pilot program could authorize
private contracting in a certain set of circumstances. Presumably, it would
specify criteria for dissemination of information, disclosure by providers to
their patients, and establishing parity of bargaining power between employ-
ee/beneficiary patients and their providers. Such a program should also specify
the scope of provisions within a contract that could be subject to negotiation:
limitations on punitive damages; development of an lHMO standard of care to
govern medical malpractice actions; development of informed consent rules
different from existing state law; contracting for a schedule of damages. For
purposes of the pilot program, the federal government could preempt state law
to allow the pilot to serve as an experiment, providing information to policy
analysts and policy makers. 92
Finally, the federal government might look at the immunity provision of the
existing PRO law. The provisions of the PRO law (and of the preceding PSRO
legislation) have never been cited as definitively establishing a defense in a
reported appellate case. It would be useful to inquire why that immunity
provision has never been used. Its disuse is unlikely to mean that the law has
91. The Supreme Court has expressed little interest in developing significant constitutional obstacles
to the linkage of federal spending and federally-imposed conditions on that spending. See South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
92. Other demonstration programs could encompass systems of enterprise liability and/or
development and implementation of a system of modified scheduling of damages for pain and suffering.
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been very effective. If it has in fact been ineffective, then it is useful to ask
why and to determine whether that type of immunity provision should be re-
worked. This issue is likely to become of particular significance as managed
care becomes of greater importance for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries
because of the cost-containment incentives stemming from pre-payment and
capitation (paying a specified amount per enrollee). The relationship between
fixed-payment schemes and alternative practice styles and medical malprac-
tice-and the role of the PRO immunity provision-is certainly worthy of
further investigation at the federal level.
